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ABSTRACT
This paper documents large cross-country differences in the long run volatility of the real exchange
rate. In particular, it shows that the real exchange rate of developing countries is approximately three
times more volatile than the real exchange rate in industrial countries. The paper tests whether this
difference in volatility can be explained by the fact that developing countries face larger shocks (both
real and nominal) and recurrent currency crises or by different elasticities to these shocks. It finds
that the magnitude of the shocks and the differences in elasticities can only explain a small part of
the difference in RER volatility between developing and industrial countries. Results from ARCH
estimations confirm that there is a substantial difference in long term volatilities between these two
sets of countries and indicate that there is also a much higher persistence of deviations of the
variance of the RER from its long run value when the economy suffers shocks of various kinds.
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Developing countries are more volatile than industrial countries. This is true when we look across 
countries at differences in the volatility of output, consumption, interest rates, or exchange rates. 
The purpose of this paper is to document cross-country differences in long run volatility of the 
real exchange rate (RER). We show that the real exchange rate tends to be much more volatile in 
developing countries than in industrial countries, even at long horizons,  and that this difference 
in volatility cannot be attributed to standard explanations based on the fact that developing 
countries face larger shocks (either real or nominal), or that they are more sensitive to these 
shocks. The paper finds that part of the explanation lies in the fact that volatility swings are more 
persistent in developing countries.  
Since the seminal contribution by Cassel (1922), Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) has been 
one of the most studied topics in international economics. In its simplest form, PPP implies that 
the price level of consumption baskets across countries is the same. This is the absolute version of 
PPP which, by expressing all variables in logs, can be written as:  
  t t t s p p + =
*  
where  t p  is the price of the domestic consumption basket, 
*
t p  is the price of the foreign basket, 
and  t s  represent the exchange rate. The idea is that if goods are traded freely then deviations 
from PPP would imply flow of goods to arbitrage the differences. Absolute PPP is only satisfied 
under very strong assumptions and the presence of non-tradable goods, transportation costs, and 
monopolistic competition are among the main reasons used in the literature to account for 
deviations from absolute PPP. Relative PPP entails weaker assumptions and, rather than requiring 
price equalization across consumption baskets, it only assumes that changes in the price of those 
consumption baskets are arbitraged away. Formally, relative PPP requires that: 
  t t t s p p ∆ + ∆ = ∆
*  
Both absolute and relative PPP have implications for the behavior of the real exchange 
rate. Absolute PPP implies that the real exchange rate is always equal to one, while relative PPP 
implies that deviations of the real exchange rate from its steady state are zero. 
  t t t t p p s q ∆ − ∆ + ∆ = ∆
*    3
PPP is an appealing theory. So much so, that it is one of the most important building 
blocks of the models in international economics. PPP, however, was never meant to characterize 
the short-term dynamics of countries. Prices do not adjust to monthly fluctuations of the exchange 
rate, and in most countries, not even to yearly movements. Dornbusch’s (1976) seminal paper 
explained exchange rate overshooting in the short run as the consequence of differential arbitrage 
speeds between the fast financial markets and the slower goods markets. In all these theories, 
arbitrage in the goods markets will eventually take place and PPP can be thought as a the long run 
characteristic of a mean reverting process. There are, however, theoretical models that by 
assuming permanent real shocks can account for an RER that follows a random walk.  
In fact, most of the attention of the empirical literature on PPP has focused on testing 
whether the RER is better described by a random walk or by a mean reverting process. In most 
cases this is done by concentrating on the stochastic properties of real exchange rate deviations 
from some trend and by estimating variations of the following regression: 
  t t t q q ε α + ∆ = ∆ − 1  (1)   
where the focus of the analysis has tended to concentrate on the coefficient α .  
While a survey of the extensive literature on the empirics of PPP is beyond the purpose of 
this paper, it is worth noting that Froot and Rogoff (1995) find that the consensus in the literature 
is that PPP holds in the long run, and that the half-life of the deviations ranges between 3 and 4 
years.
 1 It should be pointed out that this is a consensus, not an agreement (Kilian and Zha, 2002). 
For example, the area continues to be investigated and recently Imbs, et.al. (2002) suggest that 
the average half-life is smaller than a year. They argue that the longer estimates found in the 
previous literature were due to aggregation bias. Their findings, however, have been recently 
challenged by Chen and Engel (2004).
2  
While the literature has mostly concentrated on the serial correlation coefficient  α  in 
equation (1), this paper studies cross-country differences in the variance of the innovations to the 
                                                        
1 Froot and Rogoff (1995), Rogoff (1996), and Chen and Engle (2004) offer excellent surveys of the 
empirical and theoretical literature. The survey of economists reporting the consensus view was conducted 
by Kilian and Zha (2002). 
2 There are important small sample problems in the estimation of auto correlation models. There are two 
alternatives: one is to use extremely long data sets and the other one is to perform the estimation on a panel. 
Abuaf and Jorion (1990), Diebold, Husted, and Rush (1991), Frankel (1986, 1990), Glen (1992), Lothian 
and Taylor (1996), and Mark (1995), look at very long data sets. Frankel and Rose (1996), Lothian (1997), 
Oh (1996), and Wu (1996) estimate the autoregressive coefficient using panels.  Recently, some papers 
have studied non-linearities (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997, Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001, and Taylor and Peel, 
2000).   4
PPP equation ε .
3 We find that some countries have innovations whose variance is more than 20 
times larger than others. And more importantly, we find that these differences are only very 
partially explained by the higher variance of their terms of trade, monetary and output shocks, by 
differences in the sensitivities to these shocks or by differences in exchange rate regimes. These 
differences are also not accounted for by different speeds of mean reversion in the PPP equation.  
We consistently find that industrialized economies have, on average, a lower standard 
deviation of the innovations to the RER (developing economies are 2.5 times more volatile than 
industrial countries).
4 Controlling for various shocks and allowing for different parameters by 
country groups explains a very small fraction of the RER volatility. Estimating country-by-
country equations can explain up to 60 percent of the variance in the long run RER. However, 
none of these equations can reduce the ratio of the residual long run RER volatilities, which 
remains between 2 and 2.5.  
We also find that the difference in residual RER volatility is strongly associated with the 
level of development (either economic, as measured by GDP per capita, or institutional, as 
measured by rule of law) and to a lesser extent to the degree of exports diversification, as 
measured by the Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration indexes.  
  Further investigation suggest that differences in long run RER volatility are not due to the 
magnitude or frequency of the shocks but to differences in persistence of the volatility indicating 
that the way in which the RER adjusts to shocks tend to imply more persistent swings in 
volatility.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the basic facts about cross-country 
differences in RER volatility and tests different theories aimed at explaining these differences. 
Section 3 uses an ARCH model to show that part of the difference in RER volatility between 
developing and industrial countries can be explained by differences in persistence. Section 4 
concludes. 
                                                        
3 While there is a large literature that uses cross country data to gauge the consequences of RER volatility 
(especially on trade, for a recent survey see Hau, 2002), there are almost no papers that use cross-country 
data to study the causes of long run RER volatility. One exception is Hau (2002) who focuses on how 
openness affects RER volatility. 
4 In a paper that is somewhat related to ours, Cashin and McDermott (2004) find that the speed of reversion 
to PPP is faster for developed countries than for industrial countries.   5
2. The Puzzle 
The purpose of this section is to document the presence of large cross-country differences in real 
effective exchange rate (RER) volatility and show that in developing countries the real exchange 
rate tends to be much more volatile than in industrial countries, even after controlling for 
differences in external and domestic shocks.   
Our sample covers up to 74 industrial and developing countries for which we have annual 
data on real effective exchange rate over the 1980-2000 period.
5 We start with the simplest 
possible measure of volatility: the standard deviation of the growth rate of the RER. Formally, 
our first measure of volatility is given by: 
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We focus on both one year (n=1) and five-year (n=5) volatility (the upper bound for 
standard estimates of the real exchange rate half-life is 4 years, Froot and Rogoff, 1995). Figure 1 
plots five-year volatility for our sample of countries (the data have been normalized so that the 
cross-country average is equal to one). It clearly shows that industrial countries (the light bars) 
tend to have levels of real exchange rate volatility that are much lower than those of emerging 
market and developing countries (dark bars).  Portugal is the industrial country with the highest 
level of volatility and its volatility is just above the cross-country average; no other industrial 
country has levels of volatility that are above the cross-country average.  We also find very few 
emerging market or developing countries in the left part of Figure 1. The few we find tend to be 
very small (Papua New Guinea, St. Vincent, and The Bahamas). The only large emerging market 
countries that are characterized by low levels of real exchange rate volatility (i.e., less than half 
the cross-country average) are Israel and Taiwan, two rather advanced economies.   
Table 1 reports average values for one-year and five-year volatility for the whole sample 
of countries and for developing and industrial countries (not normalized to one) and tests whether 
                                                        
5 The real exchange rate data are from J.P. Morgan and the IMF International Financial Statistics. We use 
J.P. Morgan data whenever they are available and complement them with IMF data for countries that are 
not included in the J.P. Morgan dataset. All the results are robust to using the IMF as main source or to 
restricting the sample to only J.P. Morgan or IMF data. In all cases, we focus on the annual average of the 
real exchange rate index (the results are robust to using end of period data).  An increase in the RER index 
reflects a real appreciation of the currency.    6
the difference in volatility between these two groups of countries is statistically significant. It 
shows that five-year volatility is only ten percent lower than one-year volatility and that volatility 
in developing countries is always at least 2.5 times larger than volatility in industrial countries. 
The last two rows of the table show that we can always reject the hypothesis that the two groups 
of countries have the same level of volatility. The last four columns of the table also show that 
differences in volatility are not due to a specific sub-period. In fact, we obtain similar results 
when we restrict our analysis to the 1980s or to the 1990s (even though the difference between 
developing and industrial countries was slightly larger in the 1980s).   
We also look at the third and fourth moments to check whether differences in volatility 
are due to large devaluation or real appreciation episodes. Table 2 reports the skewness and 
kurtosis of RER changes. The first two columns show that the distribution of the real exchange 
rate is skewed to the left in both developing and industrial countries, indicating that large 
depreciations are more common than large appreciation. While column 1 indicates that skewness 
is significantly larger (in absolute value) in developing countries (indicating that large 
depreciation are more common in this group of countries), column 2 shows that when we focus 
on five-year periods there is no significant difference between the two samples of countries. This 
suggests that large depreciations and currency crises (that are more common in developing 
countries) cannot explain why five-year RER volatility is higher in developing countries.  
The last two columns of Table 2 show that if we focus on one-year volatility, we find that 
the distribution of RER tends to have fatter tails in the sample of developing countries. However, 
the difference in kurtosis between these two groups of countries disappears when we focus on 
five-year volatility. Again, this suggests that extreme episodes cannot fully explain the fact that 
five-year RER volatility is much higher in developing than in industrial countries. 
2.1.  Trying to Explain the Puzzle 
Why are developing countries more volatile? Clearly this suggests a misspecification error in the 
AR(1) representation of the real exchange rate – i.e., there are unobservable shocks that are more 
volatile in one sub-sample than in the other. These forms of misspecification should have been 
expected. In fact, several of them are implied by the theories we already have available.  
There are six standard explanations based on the different types of shocks and responses
6: 
(i) Developing countries are subject to larger terms of trade shocks.  (ii) Developing countries are 
                                                        
6 The higher volatility of developing countries and its potential causes in terms of external shocks and 
institutional failings is discussed in Inter-American Development Bank (1995), Hausmann and Gavin   7
subject to large volatility in GDP growth because of their limited ability to conduct counter-
cyclical monetary and fiscal policies. (iii) Developing countries are subject to large nominal 
shocks because they have non-credible monetary institutions and weak fiscal position. (iv) 
Developing countries are subject to sudden stops in capital flows that lead to currency crisis.  (v) 
Differences in volatility are due to the fact that developing countries are not as open as industrial 
countries. (vi) Differences in volatility are due to different exchange rate arrangements and in 
particular to the adoption of non-credible pegs.  
To check whether these theories can help us in explaining away the difference in RER 
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Where the variable DEV is the first difference of the real exchange rate deviation from its long 
run equilibrium level (computed as a log-linear trend).
7 Notice that expressing the dependent 
variable in terms of deviation from its long run trend is equivalent to including a country specific 
trend in Equation (2). Such a country specific trend controls for the fact that, because of the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, some countries may experience trend appreciation or depreciation.  
SHOCK is a matrix that includes various measures of shocks. Crisis is a dummy variable 
aimed at capturing the effect of currency crisis. CC is a matrix of country characteristics 
(openness, exchange rate regime, level of development) that may affect the RER response to 
shocks. Finally, we include two lags of the dependent variable to control for the possibility that 
differences in volatility are driven by differences in persistence.  i µ  is a country fixed effect.
  
After running regression (3), we recover the error term ( t i, ε ) and use it to compute 
country’s i one-year and five-year residual RER volatility as:  
                                                                                                                                                                     
(1996), De Ferranti et al. (2000), Aizenman and Pinto (2004). The role of sudden stops and openness is 
discussed in Calvo et al (2003).  
7 Formally,  ) ln (ln ) ln (ln , 1 , 1 , , , i t i t i t i t i t TREND RER TREND RER DEV − − − − − = . As 
i t TREND , (ln   ) ln , 1 i t TREND − −  is a constant, the standard deviation of  i t DEV ,  is equal to the one-
year volatility as computed in Equation (1).  As we run fixed effect estimations, we would obtain exactly 


























Clearly, when n=1 (one-year volatility), the residual volatility is just equal to the country-
specific standard deviation of the regression’s residuals. When n=5 (five-year volatility), the 
residual volatility is equal to the standard deviation of the five year average of the residuals.  
Next, we use RESVOL to check whether, after controlling for all the variables included 
in Equation 2, there is still a difference between the unexplained volatility of the real exchange 
rate in developing and developed countries. 
2.2.  The Role of Shocks 
In Table 3, we explore whether shocks can help in explaining away the difference in RER 
volatility between developing and industrial countries. In column 1, we control for terms of trade 
shocks (dtot measures the change in terms of trade and ldtot its lagged value). While we find that 
terms of trade shocks are positively and significantly correlated with changes in the RER 
(indicating that positive TOT shocks lead to an appreciation of the RER), the low R-squared 
(0.03) suggests that terms of trade shocks can only explain a very small fraction of the variance of 
the real exchange rate. Columns 1 of Tables 4 and 5 report the residual (after controlling for terms 
of trade shocks) one-year and five-year volatility. They show that the residual volatility is 
basically identical to the unconditional volatility. In the case of developing countries, the one-
year volatility goes from 0.112 to 0.109 and the five-year volatility goes from 0.103 to 0.099. In 
the case of industrial countries, one-year volatility goes from 0.044 to 0.042 and five-year 
volatility goes from 0.041 to 0.040. Hence, differences in the magnitude of terms of trade shocks 
do not explain the difference in RER volatility between developing and industrial countries. 
Developing countries remain 2.5 times more volatile than industrial countries and the difference 
between the two groups remains highly significant.  
In the second column of Table 3, we control for output shocks by including GDP growth 
(growth). Clearly, GDP growth shocks are not exogenous and may be jointly determined with 
RER innovations. However, this dual causation cleads the regression to overstate the explanatory 
power of GDP growth shocks and hence to leave a smaller residual than is warranted. This biases 
the results against the point we are making. This comment is valid for other endogenous variables 
that we consider below as well. Remember that the problems of endogeneity will affect the   9
estimation and interpretation of the coefficients in equation (1). We are, on the other hand, 
concentrating on the properties of the residuals regardless of their sources.  
While GDP growth (we use real local currency GDP growth) has a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient (indicating that positive output shocks are associated with real 
appreciations), the R-squared of the regression remains extremely low (0.05) and columns 2 of 
Tables 4 and 5 show that controlling for GDP growth neither reduces RER volatility nor reduces 
the difference in RER volatility between developing and industrial countries.  
In the third column of Table 3, we include the change in log inflation (dinf) to control for 
nominal shocks. While inflation is not statistically significant, column 3 fits the data better than 
the two previous columns (the R-squared goes to 0.09) and somewhat reduces five-year volatility 
(in developing countries it goes from 0.099 to 0.092). However, this is due to the fact that, when 
we include inflation in the regression, we lose about 300 observations. In any case, columns 3 of 
Tables 4 and 5 show that the difference between developing and industrial countries remains 
large and highly significant.    
In column 4 of Table 3, we include a dummy variable that takes value 1 during currency 
crises. The Crisis dummy takes value one when, in any two-year period, the RER depreciates by 
more than two standard deviation of the cross-country sample (according to this definition there 
are no currency crisis in industrial countries). As this variable is built using the left hand-side of 
the regression, it has a negative and highly significant coefficient and greatly increases the fit of 
the regression (the R-squared jumps to 0.3). However, controlling for currency crisis does not 
explain away the difference in volatility between developing and industrial countries. Columns 4 
of Tables 4 and 5 still show that developing countries are at least twice as volatile as industrial 
countries.  This suggests that the difference in volatility between industrial and developing 
countries is not due to the presence of a few large depreciations. This is consistent with our 
finding that there is no significant difference between the five-year skewness of developing and 
industrial countries.  
Column 5 of Table 3 controls for changes in exports (dexp) in order to check whether 
movements in the real exchange rate are due to sudden jumps demand for a country’s exports. It 
finds that the coefficient of dexp is negative and not statistically significant.  Column 6 controls 
for openness and Column 7 interacts openness with output (grop), terms of trade shocks (dtop and 
ldtop), and changes in exports (dexpop). The rationale for including these interaction terms is that 
more open economies could be better equipped to face external shocks. In particular, Calvo et al. 
(2003) show that the real depreciation brought about by a sudden stop in capital flows is   10
negatively correlated with the degree of openness.
8 We find that neither openness nor the 
interaction terms are statistically significant. We also find that the R-squared remains low (at 
0.10) and that the difference in volatility between developing and industrial countries remains 
large and highly significant  (columns 6 and 7 of Tables 4 and 5). 
In column 8 of Table 3, we interact the shock variables with an industrial country dummy 
to control for the possibility that shocks may have a different effect on the real exchange rate in 
each of the country sets. We find that the interaction terms are rarely significant. The only 
exception is the change in exports which is correlated with real depreciations in developing 
countries and real appreciations in industrial countries. In any case, controlling for these 
interactions neither reduces the level of real exchange rate volatility, nor the difference in 
volatility between industrial and developing countries (column 8 of Tables 4 and 5). 
In columns 9, 10, and 11 of Table 3, we check whether differences in RER volatility can 
be explained away by the interaction between shocks and the exchange rate regime (Broda, 2001 
shows that countries with a flexible exchange rate regime are better able to smooth-away terms of 
trade shocks). In column 9, we include two dummies based on the de facto measure of the 
exchange rate regime assembled by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000). Lys02 takes value one 
for countries with an intermediate regime and Lys03 takes value one for countries with a fixed 
exchange rate regime (the excluded dummy is for countries with a floating regime). In column 
10, we interact these dummies with the output, terms of trade, and inflation shocks discussed 
above. In column 11, we also include a dummy (switch) that takes value one when a country 
moves to a more flexible exchange rate regime (from intermediate to floating or from fixed to 
intermediate or floating). We find that, compared with countries with floating and fixed exchange 
rate regime, terms of trade shocks tend to have a larger effect on the RER in countries with an 
intermediate regime (all the other variables are not significant). Controlling for the exchange rate 
regime reduces the sample by approximately 200 observations and increases the R-squared of the 
regression to 0.20. However, columns 9, 10 and 11 of Tables 4 and 5 show that controlling for the 
role of the exchange rate regime and its interaction with shocks does not explain away the 
difference in RER volatility between developing and industrial countries. 
The last three column of Table 3 interact shocks with both exchange rate regime and 
growth. As one may expect, we find that terms of trade shocks have a smaller effect on the RER 
during periods of high growth (grdtot is negative) but, again, this does not explain away the 
                                                        
8 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) find that in models with nominal rigidities, more open economies should 
exhibit lower RER volatility. We test this hypothesis in subsection 2.4.   11
difference in volatility between developing and industrial countries (columns 12, 13, and 14 of 
Tables 4 and 5).  
2.3.  The role of Persistence 
As we found that shocks cannot explain away the difference in volatility between developing and 
industrial countries, we now explore the role of persistence by augmenting the regression with 
lagged values of the dependent variable and allowing for different persistence in developing and 
industrial countries. The idea is that the variance of the observed variable could be different 
across groups because countries have different persistence and not necessarily because the 
innovations have different variances. This section explores this possibility. 
In the first column of Table 6, we include two lags of the dependent variable. Both lags 
have a negative coefficient (statistically significant for the second lag). While the negative 
coefficients suggest that, after a shock, the RER tend to revert to its long run trend, the 
coefficients are rather small indicating that shocks tend to be persistent. The typical estimate in 
the table implies an autoregressive coefficient of about 0.8.
9 This is consistent with the PPP 
literature that has found average half-lives of about 3 to 4 years. Columns 1 of Tables 7 and 8 
show that, allowing for persistence does not reduce our measure of RER volatility and does not 
eliminate the difference in volatility between industrial and developing countries.  
In the second column of Table 6, we interact the lagged values of the dependent variable 
with an industrial country dummy and thus allow persistence to differ across the two groups of 
countries. Interestingly, we find that the coefficient on the first lag becomes positive in industrial 
countries suggesting that exchange rate shocks are more persistent (at least in the short run) in 
this group of countries.  This result is also consistent with some evidence of non-linearity of PPP 
deviations. In the data developing countries have larger deviations and if the relationship is non-
linear we should expect these countries to return to the mean faster (Obstfeld and Taylor 1997). 
However, for the purpose of this paper, allowing for different degrees of persistence does not 
affect our basic result that RER is more volatile in developing countries (column 2 of Table 7 and 
8). 
In columns 3 through 9 we introduce the variables discussed above (shocks, crisis, 
openness, and exchange rate regime). Again, we find that none of these variables can explain 
                                                        
9 Remember that we are estimating an AR(2) which means that the value of 0.8 reported in the text is the 
implied coefficient if we were to fit an AR(1). Or put it in other terms, the half-lives of the estimated AR(2) 
is the same as an AR(1) with an autoregressive coefficient of 0.8.   12
away the difference in volatility between developing and industrial countries (see columns 3-9 of 
Tables 7 and 8).  
In column 10, we allow both the shocks and persistence to have a differential effect in 
developing and industrial countries. Column 11 controls for the exchange rate regime and 
columns 12 through 16 allows for interactions between shock and exchange rate regime and 
shocks and growth. The results are similar to those of Table 3 and show that none of the 
specifications of Table 6 can explain away differences in RER volatility between industrial and 
developing countries.
10   
The results of the exercises described above are remarkable. After controlling for a very 
ample set of shocks and interacting the shocks with different country characteristics, we could, in 
the best of cases (when we interact shocks with the exchange rate regime in columns 10, 11, 13 
and 14 of Table 3 or include our crisis dummy which is built using the left hand side variable, 
column 4) reduce the residual five-year RER volatility in developing countries by 30 percent 
(from 0.103 to 0.07). Even in these cases, volatility in developing countries remains 1.7 times 
higher than the RER volatility in industrial countries (and the difference is statistically significant 
at the 1 percent confidence level). In all other cases, our set of explanatory variables can reduce 
developing countries five-year volatility by at most 20 percent. Interestingly, these explanatory 
variables account for a smaller reduction in residual volatility at 5-year horizons than at 1 year .  
As a final robustness check, we look at whether our results are driven by aggregation bias 
or by non-linearities. We start by running a set of regressions where all the shocks are interacted 
with country fixed effects. This eliminates any aggregation bias because this is equivalent to 
running the regression country by country.  After running these regressions, we recover the errors 
in the two groups, compute the residual volatility, and compare industrial with developing 
countries. The results are reported in Table 9.  They show that even after running a separate 
regression for each country, we still get that the residual volatility of the RER in developing 
countries is more than twice as large as the residual volatility in industrial countries (the ratios 
between the volatilities of the two groups of countries range between 2.4 and 2.9). Table 10, 
reports results of country by country regressions where we also control for non-linearities by 
entering the squares of various shocks. Again, this does not eliminate differences in RER 
volatility between developing and industrial countries and the ratio between the volatility of the 
two group of countries remains in the 2.3-2.7 range. 
                                                        
10 To check the robustness of our results, we also reestimated the specifications of Table 6 by using  the 
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and obtained results that are essentially identical 
to those of Table 6.   13
In Figure 2 we illustrate the real exchange rate volatility puzzle in yet another way. We 
plot summary statistics of all the regressions we have estimated thus far. For each specification 
we plot the R-squared of the equation separately for industrial and for developing countries, 
shown respectively in dark and light color bars (measured from the left axis). The idea is to 
measure how much can be explained by the shocks and interactions we are including in the 
regressions. Note that as we include more explanatory variables, the R squares go up. However, 
in general, the equations do a significantly better job in explaining the within country volatility 
among industrial countries than among developing countries. Note also that as more variables are 
included, the R-square increases, especially after equation 33 when we run country by country 
equations (this should be expected because the country by country regressions have less than 
fifteen degrees of freedom).  
However, the line depicted in the figure indicates the ratio of the residual volatilities 
between developing and industrialized countries is very stable. Notice that the ratio fluctuates 
between 2 and 2.5 regardless of the specification. Therefore, the puzzle is, then, that 
independently of how much of the RER volatility we can explain, we are unable to make any 
progress in explaining the relative residual volatilities of these two sets of countries.  
2.4.  Going beyond the industrial-developing split 
So far we compared volatility between developing and industrial countries without asking 
whether there is any specific characteristic of these two groups of countries that may explain the 
differences in volatility we just documented. In what follows we use the one-year residual 
volatility obtained by running the country by country regressions that includes all controls and 
two lags of the dependent variable (column 8 of Table 9) and regress these volatilities over a set 
of country characteristics (measured as averages for the 1980-2000 period unless otherwise 
noted).  In the first column, we control for the log of GDP per capita (to control for differences in 
the level of development), the volatility of terms of trade, and the degree of openness. As 
expected, we find that more developed countries have lower residual RER volatility (the 
coefficient of LGDPPC is negative and statistically significant) and, as suggested by Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (2000) and Calvo et al. (2003), we also find that more open countries have lower residual 
RER volatility. At the same time, we find that terms of trade volatility is not correlated with 
residual RER volatility (this should not be surprising because in computing residual RER 
volatility we already netted out the effect of terms of trade shocks). In the second and third 
columns, we also control for GDP growth volatility and volatility of exports and find an 
insignificant relationship (again, this was expected because in computing residual volatility we   14
already netted out the effect of GDP and export shocks). In the fourth column, we control for rule 
of law (measured over the 1996-2002 period) and we find that this variable has the expected 
negative sign but that it is not statistically significant. We also find that once we include rule of 
law, GDP per capita is no longer significant (and the coefficient drops from 0.01 to 0.005).
11 This 
is due to the fact that GDP per capita and rule of law are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.89) and a Wald test indicates that the two variables are jointly significant with a p-
value of 0.001. In the fifth and sixth columns we control for export concentrations at the 4 and 10 
digits (the idea is that countries with less diversified export structures might experience higher 
volatility). We use data on US imports by country and calculate Hirschman-Herfindahl indexes of 
concentration at the 4 (CONC4) and 10 (CONC10) digit levels (the concentration indexes are 
measured as averages over the 1990-2000 period). As expected, the coefficients are positive and 
marginally significant in the case of CONC10. Columns 7, 8, 9 control for country size (measured 
by total GDP) and two measures of financial development (DC_GDP is an average over the 
1990-2000 period) and find that none of these variables are significantly correlated with residual 
volatility (when we control for total GDP we find that openness is no longer significant).
 12   
Equations 11 through 13 put several of the explanatory variables together.  The main 
message of these equations is that a measure of development – whether GDP per capita or rule of 
law – is robustly related to the difference in residual RER volatility. In addition, export 
concentration is also robust to the inclusion of other variables. In particular, it is robust to the 
inclusion of openness and size, two variables with which it is related.
13 However, neither of these 
two latter variables are robustly related to RER volatility.
14  
Table 12 uses the equations estimated in Table 11 to account for the difference in average 
residual RER volatility between industrial countries (2.3 percent) and developing countries (5.6 
percent). The estimated equations when applied to the average characteristics of industrial and 
developing countries can allow for a decomposition of the residual volatilities. The equations 
                                                        
11 It should be pointed out that, as rule of law is measured in the late 1990s rather than for the whole period, 
this variable is “more endogenous” than GDP per capita. 
12 Larger economies tend to be more closed and country size and openness have a negative correlation of 
0.5 in our dataset.  Our results are in contrast with the finding of Hau (2002) who find that openness is a 
robust predictor of long run RER volatility. One difference between our and his empirical strategy is that 
we focus on residual volatility and, in the cross-country analysis, we also control for country size and 
export concentration. 
13 There is a relatively high and negative correlation between CONC10 and LGDP of -0.41 in our dataset 
and there is no correlation between CONC10 and openness (0.05). Inclusion of both size as measured by 
LGDP and CONC10 makes openness no longer statistically significant. 
14 These results are robust to estimation techniques that put less weights on outliers.    15
‘explain’  between 71 and 100 percent of the difference. In general, the level of development, 
measured either as LGDPPC or as the index of Rule of Law or in tandem, can explain between 80 
and 100 percent of the difference, depending on the specification. Differences in export 
concentration can account for about 18 percent of the difference. Differences in openness do not 
help explain the differences, as developing countries are on average more open than developed 
countries. Differences in size also do not explain the RER puzzle as larger countries tend to have 
more residual RER volatility. Hence, the level of development and of export concentration seems 
to be involved in any explanation of why residual RER volatility is higher in developing 
countries.  
3. Another way to look at persistence and a possible answer to 
the puzzle 
So far we compared RER volatility between industrial and developing countries by testing the 
difference between average volatility in the two groups of countries or by regressing residual 
volatility on a series of country characteristics. We now estimate an ARCH model that allows us 
to use a proper regression set up to test whether there is indeed a difference between long-run 
RER volatility in developing and industrial countries. We also use the ARCH model to check 
whether the difference in RER volatility between developing and industrial countries can be 
explained by differences in persistence in the ARCH component of the regression.   
Formally, we jointly estimate the following two ARCH (2) equations: 
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The first equation (mean equation) measures how shocks and persistence affect the level 
of the dependent variable (in our case the change of the real exchange rate). The second equation 
– the variance equation –  describes the evolution of the variance and allows us to measure the 
difference in the long run variance between developing and industrial countries.    16
Equation 1 in Table 13 estimates the above model by setting c and d equal to zero in the 
mean equation and  2 1 2 1 2 1 , , , , , , , , φ φ ψ ψ λ λ δ γ α  equal to zero in the variance equation. In this case, 
the constant (0.0132) measures the long run variance in developing countries and the constant 
plus β (0.0132-0.0118=0.0014), the long run variance in industrial countries. Hence, the fact that 
the industrial country dummy has a negative and highly significant coefficient indicates that the 
conditional variance of the real exchange rate is significantly higher in developing countries. Note 
that these numbers reflect the estimated variances, which are the squares of the standard 
deviations. By taking the square roots of the estimated long run variances we obtain 11.5 percent 
for developing countries and 3.7 percent for industrial countries, numbers which are in line with 
the results obtained in the previous sections (Equation 1 of Table 13 is comparable to Equation 4 
of Table 6; the residual 5 year volatility of this latter equation is 1.09 percent in developing 
countries and 3.5 percent in industrial countries).  
In Equation 2, we explore whether the two sets of countries have the same persistence in 
the variance equation. We address this issue by adding two ARCH terms to the previous equation.  
The estimated long run variances of these equations are given by  
2 1 1 ψ ψ
ϕ
− −
= NONIND h  for 
developing countries and by 




= IND h  for industrial countries, the estimated ratio 





(i.e., long run RER volatility is five times higher in developing countries). Taking square roots of 
this ratio we obtain 2.264, which is in line with our estimated relative residual volatilities of the 
previous section.  
Equation 3 allows the variance of developing and industrial countries to have different 
persistence and shows that persistence is stronger in developing countries. While the ARCH 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant, the interaction terms are negative and 
statistically significant and indicate that persistence in the variance of the real exchange rate of 
industrial countries is a small fraction of that in developing countries (0.55 vs. 0.20 for ARCH1 
and 0.53 vs. 0.04 for ARCH2). In this case, the respective long run variances are given by: 
2 1 1 ψ ψ
ϕ
− −
= NONIND h  and 
2 1 2 1 1 φ φ ψ ψ
β ϕ
− − − −
+
= IND h . Notice that  2 1 ψ ψ + is very close to 
one (1.09) indicating that the model could be misspecified because the variance of developing 
countries could be either negative or explosive.   17
In equation 4 we allow for various shocks and the lagged values of the real exchange rate 
to have an effect on the variance (i.e., we relax the assumption that  2 1, , λ λ α  are equal to zero). In 
the variance equation we square all our explanatory variables, so that the coefficient of, say, terms 
of trade, should be interpreted as the effect of terms of trade shock (either positive or negative) on 
the variance of the RER. We find that past RER shocks increase RER volatility but we find no 
significant effect of terms of trade or output shocks (the estimated effects are positive but not 
significant). The long run variance of the RER in developing and industrial countries can be 
calculated in the same way as we did in Equation 2  yielding values of 0.00414 and 0.00072, 
which correspond to volatilities of 6.4 percent and 2.7 percent and a ratio of volatilities of 2.4.  
In Equation 5, we reproduce equation 4 but now we allow for interaction in the mean 
equation (i.e., we relax the assumption that c and d are zero) this allows industrial and developing 
countries to have different slopes in the mean equation.  None of the interaction terms is 
statistically significant  indicating that there is no evidence that shocks affect the real exchange 
rate of developing countries differently from the way they affect the real exchange rate of 
industrial countries. We find almost identical results for the estimated long run RER volatilities 
and of the estimated persistence terms in the variance equation.   
Finally in Equation 6, we also allow for different persistence in the two sets of countries 
of the effects of the RER, TOT and output shocks on the variance equation (i.e., relax the 
assumption that γ  and δ  are equal to zero).  Several results are worth noting. First of all, the 
difference on the ARCH coefficient remains large and highly statistically significant indicating 
that persistence is lower in industrial countries, even after allowing the various shocks to have a 
differential effect in the two groups of countries. We find that terms of trade shocks and the 
second lag of the dependent variable have a smaller effect on the volatility of the RER in 
industrial countries.  Also, we now find that the IND dummy in the variance equation is no longer 
significant. The estimated ratio of long run volatilities between industrial and developing 
countries now declines to 1.57,  indicating that part of the long run variance of developing 
countries is explained by difference in persistence.    
All this points to the fact that the difference in real exchange rate volatility documented 
in Section 2 is neither fully explained by differences in the magnitude of the shocks or by how 
shocks directly affect the level of the real exchange rate, or their volatilities. Part of the 
explanation is that the adjustment of the shifts in the variance tends to be slower in developing 
countries.  
As a final robustness analysis, we augment the ARCH model with a further set of time 
invariant continuous variables that are likely to be correlated with the industrial country dummy.   18
The results are reported in Tables 14 through 16. The structure of the estimations is similar to that 
of Table 10.  
In Table 14, we include a variable measuring the log of average (over the 1980-2000 
period) GDP per capita (GDPPC). This is the best proxy for economic development and it is 
highly correlated with the IND dummy. Column 1 shows that even controlling for GDP per 
capita, the industrial dummy remains negative and significant. Columns 2, allows for differences 
in the ARCH terms between the two sets of countries. The estimated persistence in the industrial 
countries is close to nil, while it is large in developing countries. Moreover, allowing for a 
difference in persistence drastically reduces the value and significance of the coefficient on IND. 
This result is essentially repeated in the rest of Table 14 and in the subsequent tables. If we do not 
allow for differences in the ARCH terms between the two sets of countries, we usually get a 
large, negative and significant  coefficient on IND. Once we allow for differences in the ARCH 
terms we find large differences in persistence between the two sets of countries. In addition, the 
coefficient on the IND term declines drastically and becomes insignificant. Tables 15 and 16 
repeat these experiments using rule of law and financial development as continuous proxies for 
the industrial country dummy.  
4. Final Remarks 
The aim of this paper was to document the main facts about long run RER volatility. It showed 
that the long run RER of developing countries is between 2 and 2.5 times larger than that of 
industrial countries. We also show that these differences are only partially due to the fact that 
developing countries face larger shocks (both real and nominal) or to differences in the sensitivity 
of the RER to these shocks. In fact, after controlling for such shocks the ratio of the residual 
volatilities between the two sets of countries remains essentially unaffected. We also show that 
differences in residual volatility (i.e. after controlling for shocks and sensitivities) are strongly 
correlated with the level of development and to the degree of diversification of the economy (as 
measured by the concentration of its export basket).  
In addition, we show that a significant part of the larger measured RER volatility in 
developing countries is associated with a much larger persistence of shocks to the variance of the 
RER itself, as captured by different ARCH coefficients.  
Any model that attempts to explain the long run RER volatility puzzle would need to 
explain not only the potentially larger sensitivities of the RER to shocks in developing countries, 
but also the much longer persistence of shocks both to the level and volatility of the RER.    19
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5. Appendix 
 
List of countries included in the full sample  
Industrial: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.  
Developing: Argentina, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Fiji, 
The Gambia, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, St. Lucia, St.Vincent & Grenadines, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia. 
 
List and definition of variables 
Variable Name  Definition  Source 
Real Exchange Rate (RER)  Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Index (yearly average) 
JP Morgan 
IMF International Financial 
Statistics 
Terms of trade (TOT)  Index of terms of trade for 
goods and services 
(1995=100). 
IMF 
GROWTH  Real GDP per capita growth in 
local currency. 
World Bank, WDI 
Inflation (INFL)  Inflation measured as changes 
in CPI. 
World Bank, WDI 
CRISIS  Dummy variable that takes 
value one when, in any two-
year period, the RER 
depreciates by more than two 
standard deviation of the 
cross-country sample.  
Authors’ calculations based on 
RER data from JP Morgan and 
IMF 
Change in Exports (DEXP)  Percentage change in real 
exports in goods and services 
(measured in US$). 
World Bank, WDI 
OPEN  Openness defined as export 
plus imports divided by GDP. 
Authors’ calculations based on 
World Bank’s, WDI data 
LYS  Exchange rate regime. Lys01 
takes value one for countries 
with a floating exchange rate 
(excluded dummy). Lys02 
takes value one for countries 
with an intermediate regime. 
Lys03 takes value one for 
countries with a fixed 
exchange rate regime. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2001)   23
 
LGDPPC  Log of average (over the 
1980-2000 period) GDP per 
capita measured in 1995 US$.  
Authors’ calculations based on 
GDP per capita data from the 
World Bank’s WDI 
VOL_TOT  Volatility of terms of trade 
over the 1980-2000 period. 
Computed as the standard 
deviation of the terms of trade 
index. 
Authors’ calculations based on 
terms of trade data form the 
IMF 
VOL_GROWTH  Volatility of local currency 
real GDP per capita growth. 
Computed as the standard 
deviation DEXP over the 
1980-2000 period. 
Authors’ calculations based on 
GDP per capita data from the 
World Bank’s WDI 
VOL_EXP Volatility  of  exports. 
Computed as the standard 
deviation GROWTH over the 
1980-2000 period. 
Authors’ calculations based on 
exports data from the World 
Bank’s WDI 
RULE_WB  Rule of Law from Kauffman 
et al. (2003). Average over the 
1996-2002 period. 
Kauffman et al. (2003) 
CONC4 and CONC10  Four and ten digits Hirschman 
– Herfindahl concentration of 
US imports by country of 
origin. Average over the1990-
2000 period. 
Trade Data Online from 
Industry Canada 
LGDP  Log of average (over the 
1980-2000 period) GDP 
measured in 1995 US$.  
Authors’ calculations based on 
GDP data from the World 
Bank’s WDI 
FIN_DEPTH  Private Credit over GDP 
average over the 1980-2000 
period. 
Beck et al. (2000) 
DC_GDP  Domestic Credit over GDP. 
Average over the 1990-2000 
period. 
World Bank’s WDI. 
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Table 1: Real Exchange rate volatility in industrial and developing countries 
















Combined  0.089 0.083 0.099 0.074 0.072 0.070 
Developing  0.112 0.103 0.125 0.094 0.088 0.085 
Industrial 0.044 0.041 0.045 0.034 0.040 0.037 
Difference  0.068 0.062 0.081 0.060 0.048 0.048 
t-statistics 4.262 4.818 3.769 3.689 3.176 4.130 
P  (Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.000 
 
 
Table 2: Skewness and kurtosis or RER changes  








Combined -0.73  -0.24  4.12  2.40 
Developing -1.02  -0.21  4.74  2.37 
Industrial -0.14  -0.32  3.08  2.46 
Difference -0.88  0.11  1.65  -0.09 
t-statistics -4.40  0.89  2.54  -0.46 
P  (|dev|>|IND|)  1.000 0.19 0.99  0.33 
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Table 3: Panel Regressions, the Role of Shocks 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
  fddev fddev fddev  fddev  fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev 
dtot  0.130 0.163 0.242  0.199  0.262 0.262 0.383 0.281 0.315 0.087 0.063 0.338 0.179 0.331 
  (4.75)*** (5.62)*** (6.72)***  (6.27)***  (6.64)*** (6.40)*** (4.10)*** (6.58)*** (6.60)***  (0.87)  (0.62)  (7.14)***  (1.76)*  (2.40)** 
ldtot  0.117 0.103 0.150  0.084  0.158 0.164 0.072 0.176 0.167 0.060 0.044 0.170 0.063 0.166 
  (4.24)***  (3.63)***  (4.26)*** (2.70)*** (4.42)***  (4.36)***  (0.83)  (4.53)***  (3.86)***  (0.69)  (0.49)  (3.96)***  (0.71)  (1.38) 
growth    0.286 0.381  0.184  0.399 0.397 0.507 0.424 0.482 0.528 0.471 0.479 0.352 0.428 
    (3.90)*** (4.33)***  (2.36)**  (4.26)*** (3.94)*** (2.74)*** (3.99)*** (3.91)***  (2.07)**  (1.82)*  (2.16)**  (1.22)  (1.38) 
dinf      -0.001  0.008  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.006 0.006 -0.000 0.007 0.009 
      (0.11) (1.92)* (0.05) (0.20) (0.30) (0.02) (0.12) (0.50) (0.46) (0.02) (0.57) (0.62) 
c r i s i s       - 0 . 2 5 6             
      (17.26)***            
dexp          -0.026 -0.041 -0.084 -0.077 -0.088 -0.104 -0.108 -0.082 -0.095 -0.261 
          (0.89)  (1.35)  (1.61)  (2.28)** (2.32)**  (2.77)***  (2.81)***  (2.17)** (2.52)**  (3.68)*** 
open          -0.017  -0.011  -0.014  -0.007  0.011  0.016  0.001  0.012  0.042 
            (1.06) (0.58) (0.85) (0.41) (0.32) (0.47) (0.04) (0.33) (1.12) 
grop           -0.109         -0.053 
           (0.61)         (0.23) 
d t o p            - 0 . 1 7 9          - 0 . 1 7 8  
           (1.40)         (1.12) 
ldtop           0.140         -0.120 
           (1.18)         (0.83) 
dexpop           0.039         0.110 
           (0.77)         (1.79)* 
INDdtot           -0.048        0.028 
            ( 0 . 2 8 )         ( 0 . 1 4 )  
INDldtot            -0.222        -0.198 
            ( 1 . 4 1 )         ( 1 . 0 7 )  
I N D g r o w t h             - 0 . 2 3 9         - 0 . 0 9 3  
            ( 0 . 6 9 )         ( 0 . 2 1 )  
INDdinf           -0.004        -0.007 
            ( 0 . 2 8 )         ( 0 . 4 5 )  
INDopen            -0.016        -0.063 
            ( 0 . 2 6 )         ( 0 . 7 8 )  
INDdexp            0.191        0.332 
            (2.37)**        (3.32)*** 
lys02             -0.026  -0.038  -0.035  -0.028  -0.042  -0.038 
             (1.99)**  (1.54)  (1.40)  (2.03)**  (1.68)*  (1.53) 
lys03             0.013  0.024  0.034  0.017  0.028  0.035 
             (0.78)  (0.82)  (1.12)  (0.92)  (0.93)  (1.13) 
lys02dtot              0.516  0.541    0.389  0.390 
              (4.43)***  (4.60)***    (3.28)***  (3.27)*** 
lys03dtot              -0.058  -0.021    -0.099  -0.080 
              (0.47)  (0.17)    (0.80)  (0.62) 
lys02ldtot              0.170  0.196    0.167  0.114 
              (1.52)  (1.71)*    (1.45)  (0.99) 
lys03ldtot              0.108  0.142    0.116  0.114 
              (1.00)  (1.28)    (1.05)  (1.00)   26
lys02gr              0.499  0.494    0.526  0.558 
              (1.59)  (1.53)    (1.63)  (1.71)* 
lys03gr              -0.438  -0.438    -0.384  -0.383 
              (1.47)  (1.45)    (1.17)  (1.16) 
lys02dinf              -0.001  0.002    -0.005  -0.003 
              (0.04)  (0.13)    (0.29)  (0.16) 
lys03dinf              -0.015  -0.015    -0.012  -0.014 
              (1.04)  (1.02)    (0.82)  (0.84) 
lys02open              0.011  0.010    0.013  0.008 
              (0.36)  (0.32)    (0.42)  (0.27) 
lys03open              -0.007  -0.012    -0.008  -0.010 
              (0.20)  (0.34)    (0.24)  (0.27) 
switch               0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
               (0.18)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.14) 
grdtot                -6.463  -5.466  -5.464 
                (6.59)***  (5.49)***  (5.48)*** 
grldtot                -1.969  -1.306  -1.353 
                (1.91)*  (1.25)  (1.28) 
grinf                -0.106  -0.168  -0.135 
                (0.94)  (1.39)  (1.11) 
gropen                -0.132  0.031  0.000 
                (0.64)  (0.13)  (.) 
Constant  0.000 -0.004 -0.003  0.012  -0.004 0.011 0.007 0.014 0.006 -0.008 -0.014 0.002 -0.006 -0.019 
  (0.15) (1.17) (0.93)  (3.75)***  (1.00) (0.87) (0.46) (0.79) (0.34) (0.33) (0.53) (0.12) (0.24) (0.66) 
Observations  1387  1364  1066  1066  1038  949 949 949 768 768 741 741 741 741 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 0.09  0.30  0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.26 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4: Residual One year Volatility from Table 3 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Combined  0.087 0.087 0.085 0.075 0.084 0.085 0.085 
Developing  0.109 0.109 0.106 0.092 0.106 0.106 0.105 
Industrial  0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.043 
Difference  0.066 0.066 0.065 0.050 0.064 0.063 0.062 
t-statistics  4.242 4.314 4.060 3.575 4.015 3.732 3.721 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Combined  0.084 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.084 
Developing  0.106 0.106 0.102 0.101 0.103 0.100 0.102 
Industrial  0.040 0.048 0.052 0.052 0.050 0.052 0.045 
Difference  0.066 0.058 0.051 0.049 0.053 0.049 0.057 
t-statistics  3.957 3.409 3.141 2.936 3.252 3.059 3.676 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999 0.998 1.000 
The volatilities are computed as the one-year standard deviation from the residuals  
obtained from the regressions in the corresponding columns of Table 3 
 
Table 5: Residual Five year Volatility from Table 3 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Combined  0.079 0.079 0.073 0.061 0.071 0.070 0.070 
Developing  0.099 0.099 0.092 0.073 0.089 0.087 0.087 
Industrial  0.040 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.038 0.038 
Difference  0.059 0.059 0.053 0.036 0.052 0.049 0.049 
t-statistics  4.948 5.071 4.780 3.635 4.670 4.080 4.057 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Combined  0.070 0.067 0.062 0.060 0.065 0.061 0.062 
Developing  0.088 0.081 0.072 0.069 0.078 0.071 0.073 
Industrial  0.036 0.038 0.041 0.041 0.037 0.040 0.039 
Difference  0.051 0.043 0.030 0.028 0.040 0.030 0.034 
t-statistics  4.342 3.418 2.571 2.377 2.946 2.435 2.780 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 0.999 0.993 0.989 0.998 0.991 0.996 
The volatilities are computed as the five-year standard deviation from the residuals  
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Table 6: Panel Regressions, Shocks and Persistence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
  fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev  fddev  fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev fddev 
fddev1  -0.036 -0.064 -0.078 -0.069 -0.088  -0.258  -0.100 -0.119 -0.118 -0.126 -0.158 -0.160 -0.155 -0.146 -0.153 -0.167 
  (1.29)  (2.09)**  (2.58)**  (2.29)**  (2.80)***  (9.19)***  (3.12)*** (3.58)*** (3.53)*** (3.77)*** (4.28)*** (4.40)*** (4.19)*** (3.99)*** (4.22)*** (4.61)*** 
fddev2  -0.132 -0.138 -0.132 -0.122 -0.127  -0.098  -0.135 -0.131 -0.128 -0.133 -0.185 -0.168 -0.166 -0.166 -0.159 -0.158 
  (4.83)*** (4.60)*** (4.46)*** (4.12)*** (4.12)***  (3.73)***  (4.30)*** (4.01)*** (3.92)*** (4.08)*** (4.73)*** (4.39)*** (4.14)*** (4.16)*** (4.04)*** (4.03)*** 
INDL1    0.325 0.301 0.308 0.312  0.488  0.312 0.341 0.330 0.458 0.354 0.376 0.371 0.372 0.392 0.503 
    (2.39)** (2.25)** (2.31)** (2.34)** (4.31)*** (2.31)** (2.44)** (2.36)**  (3.15)***  (2.30)** (2.51)** (2.44)** (2.44)**  (2.63)*** (3.28)*** 
INDL2    -0.053 -0.025 -0.027 -0.025  -0.075  -0.032 -0.063 -0.074 -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003 -0.045 -0.019 0.077 
    (0.41) (0.19) (0.21) (0.19)  (0.68)  (0.24) (0.46) (0.54) (0.10) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.29) (0.13) (0.51) 
dtot      0.173 0.168 0.239  0.203  0.255 0.261 0.408 0.282 0.326 0.166 0.141 0.347 0.271 0.393 
      (4.91)*** (4.78)*** (6.33)***  (6.34)***  (6.14)*** (6.09)*** (4.03)*** (6.32)*** (6.48)***  (1.56)  (1.31)  (6.93)***  (2.50)**  (2.72)*** 
ldtot      0.131 0.115 0.169  0.125  0.174 0.176 0.115 0.197 0.189 0.067 0.033 0.196 0.063 0.179 
      (3.70)*** (3.25)*** (4.42)***  (3.88)***  (4.48)*** (4.39)***  (1.22)  (4.76)*** (4.10)***  (0.75)  (0.36)  (4.24)***  (0.69)  (1.39) 
growth        0.328 0.370  0.098  0.378 0.396 0.444 0.404 0.426 0.483 0.436 0.450 0.301 0.318 
        (3.70)*** (3.89)***  (1.20)  (3.77)*** (3.66)***  (2.21)**  (3.54)*** (3.24)***  (1.83)*  (1.62)  (1.89)*  (1.00)  (0.99) 
dinf          -0.001  0.005  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003  0.002 -0.001 0.005  0.000 
          (0.16)  (1.37)  (0.12) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.22) (0.25) (0.19) (0.17) (0.42) (0.00) 
c r i s i s         - 0 . 3 0 0             
        (19.39)***            
dexp              -0.030 -0.051 -0.118 -0.088 -0.113 -0.128 -0.131 -0.103 -0.116 -0.317 
          (0.97)  (1.57)  (1.98)**  (2.46)**  (2.78)***  (3.18)***  (3.17)***  (2.52)**  (2.88)***  (3.79)*** 
open            -0.016  -0.015  -0.013  -0.002  0.015  0.020  0.008  0.012  0.036 
                (0.92) (0.77) (0.69) (0.11) (0.43) (0.55) (0.36) (0.35) (0.96) 
g r o p              - 0 . 0 3 4          0 . 0 6 3  
             ( 0 . 1 7 )          ( 0 . 2 5 )  
d t o p              - 0 . 2 0 9          - 0 . 1 1 7  
             ( 1 . 5 2 )          ( 0 . 6 9 )  
ldtop             0.097         -0.132 
             ( 0 . 7 3 )          ( 0 . 8 2 )  
dexpop             0.069         0.141 
             ( 1 . 1 6 )          ( 1 . 8 8 ) *  
INDdtot             -0.023        -0.008 
              ( 0 . 1 2 )         ( 0 . 0 3 )  
INDldtot              -0.361        -0.318 
              ( 2 . 1 2 ) * *         ( 1 . 6 0 )  
INDgrowth              -0.098        0.129 
              ( 0 . 2 7 )         ( 0 . 2 8 )  
INDdinf             -0.001        0.003 
              ( 0 . 0 4 )         ( 0 . 1 7 )  
INDopen              -0.009        -0.059 
              ( 0 . 1 4 )         ( 0 . 7 2 )  
INDdexp              0.213        0.407 
              ( 2 . 3 8 ) * *         ( 3 . 6 7 ) * * *  
lys02               -0.028  -0.045  -0.045  -0.034  -0.053  -0.048 
               (2.10)**  (1.77)*  (1.72)*  (2.38)**  (2.09)**  (1.85)* 
lys03               0.014  0.025  0.028  0.012  0.023  0.033 
               (0.82)  (0.85)  (0.91)  (0.62)  (0.73)  (1.07)   30
lys02dtot                0.422  0.446    0.284  0.307 
                (3.44)***  (3.59)***    (2.27)**  (2.45)** 
lys03dtot                -0.133  -0.099    -0.198  -0.183 
                (1.02)  (0.74)    (1.49)  (1.34) 
lys02ldtot                0.226  0.271    0.221  0.177 
                (1.95)*  (2.27)**    (1.83)*  (1.48) 
lys03ldtot                0.108  0.158    0.145  0.147 
                (0.95)  (1.35)    (1.25)  (1.25) 
lys02gr                0.475  0.466    0.507  0.530 
                (1.47)  (1.40)    (1.52)  (1.58) 
lys03gr                -0.494  -0.503    -0.575  -0.589 
                (1.57)  (1.57)    (1.67)*  (1.71)* 
lys02dinf                -0.003  -0.000    -0.008  -0.001 
                (0.20)  (0.01)    (0.47)  (0.07) 
lys03dinf                -0.010  -0.010    -0.009  -0.004 
                (0.70)  (0.66)    (0.60)  (0.21) 
lys02open                0.017  0.015    0.018  0.011 
                (0.53)  (0.45)    (0.57)  (0.34) 
lys03open                -0.004  -0.009    -0.005  -0.010 
                (0.12)  (0.26)    (0.13)  (0.29) 
switch                 -0.008  -0.011  -0.012  -0.012 
                 (0.53)  (0.76)  (0.89)  (0.86) 
grdtot                  -6.106  -5.652  -5.641 
                  (5.90)***  (5.42)***  (5.40)*** 
grldtot                  -2.586  -1.986  -1.945 
                  ( 2 . 3 1 ) * *   ( 1 . 7 1 ) *   ( 1 . 6 6 ) *  
grinf                  -0.116  -0.222  -0.195 
                  ( 1 . 0 0 )   ( 1 . 8 0 ) *   ( 1 . 5 8 )  
gropen                  -0.188  0.091  0.000 
                  (0.82)  (0.36)  (.) 
Constant  0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.004  0.015  -0.003 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.005 -0.009 -0.010 0.005 0.001 -0.010 
  (0.08) (0.06) (0.19) (1.42) (0.95)  (4.61)***  (0.88) (0.79) (0.68) (0.57) (0.26) (0.36) (0.35) (0.23) (0.03) (0.34) 
Observations  1314  1152  1152  1151  1006  1006 981 899 899 899 730 730 704 704 704 704 
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.12  0.37  0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.30 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses         
*  significant  at  10%;  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1%             
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Table 7: Residual One year volatility from table 6 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Combined  0.088 0.087 0.087 0.087 0.084 0.073 0.084 0.084 
Developing  0.110 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.106 0.090 0.106 0.106 
Industrial  0.043 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041 
Difference  0.067 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.066 0.050 0.066 0.065 
t-statistics  4.108 4.254 4.479 4.532 4.209 3.922 4.174 3.960 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Combined  0.084 0.083 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.084 
Developing  0.106 0.106 0.105 0.102 0.101 0.103 0.101 0.102 
Industrial  0.041 0.037 0.047 0.051 0.052 0.049 0.052 0.045 
Difference  0.065 0.069 0.058 0.051 0.049 0.054 0.050 0.057 
t-statistics  3.958 4.270 3.623 3.287 3.059 3.472 3.278 3.891 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.998 1.000 0.999 1.000 
 
 
Table 8: Residual Five year volatility from Table 6 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Combined  0.086 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.078 0.069 0.076 0.075 
Developing  0.108 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.101 0.087 0.099 0.097 
Industrial  0.042 0.035 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Difference  0.065 0.075 0.074 0.074 0.067 0.054 0.066 0.064 
t-statistics  4.767 5.418 5.541 5.648 5.148 4.374 5.044 4.384 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
   (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Combined  0.075 0.074 0.073 0.069 0.066 0.070 0.067 0.066 
Developing  0.096 0.098 0.091 0.082 0.079 0.087 0.081 0.083 
Industrial  0.034 0.029 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.034 0.037 0.031 
Difference  0.062 0.069 0.055 0.043 0.041 0.054 0.044 0.052 
t-statistics  4.292 4.833 3.368 2.975 2.824 3.341 3.087 3.751 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.999 0.998 1.000 
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Table 9: Residual Volatility from country by country regressions 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
  One year 
Combined 0.076  0.072  0.062  0.056  0.070  0.064  0.055  0.045 
Developing 0.097  0.091  0.078  0.070  0.088  0.081  0.068  0.056 
Industrial 0.035  0.033  0.031  0.028  0.032  0.031  0.028  0.023 
Difference 0.062  0.057  0.048  0.043  0.056  0.050  0.040  0.033 
t-statistics 4.693  4.473  4.045  4.228  4.375  4.203  3.691  3.663 
P(Dev>Ind) 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
   (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
  Five-year 
Combined 0.067  0.052  0.115  0.047  0.061  0.054  0.045  0.038 
Developing 0.086  0.066  0.148  0.061  0.077  0.068  0.057  0.048 
Industrial 0.030  0.024  0.053  0.022  0.027  0.026  0.022  0.020 
Difference 0.056  0.043  0.096  0.039  0.050  0.042  0.036  0.028 
t-statistics 5.740  5.240  5.240  4.693  4.514  4.247  4.165  3.213 
P(Dev>Ind) 1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.999 
Columns 1 and 9 only control for TOT, Columns 2 and 10 control for TOT and Growth,  Columns 3 and 11  control 
for TOT, Growth, and inflation, Columns 4 and 12  control for TOT,  Growth, inflation, and export growth, 
Columns 5 and 13 only control for TOT + two lags of the dependent variable Columns 6 and 14 control for TOT and 
Growth + two lags of the dependent variable, Columns 7 and 15 control for TOT, Growth, and inflation + two lags 
of the dependent variable, Columns 8 and 16  control for TOT, Growth, inflation, and export growth + two lags of 
the dependent variable 
 
Table 10: Residual volatility with country by country regressions and non-linearities 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  One  year volatility 
Combined  0.048 0.053 0.051 0.053 0.037 0.042 0.041 0.040 
Developing  0.061 0.066 0.063 0.066 0.046 0.052 0.050 0.049 
Industrial  0.024 0.026 0.027 0.025 0.019 0.022 0.022 0.021 
Difference  0.037 0.040 0.036 0.041 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.028 
t-statistics  3.740 3.862 3.733 4.075 3.087 3.152 3.044 3.208 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.999 
   (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
  Five year volatility 
Combined  0.042 0.047 0.043 0.044 0.032 0.038 0.036 0.033 
Developing  0.054 0.060 0.055 0.057 0.040 0.048 0.045 0.042 
Industrial  0.021 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.017 
Difference  0.033 0.038 0.034 0.036 0.023 0.028 0.025 0.024 
t-statistics  4.116 4.079 4.135 4.403 2.972 2.776 2.755 2.972 
P(Dev>Ind)  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.998 0.996 0.996 0.998 
These are the residuals of country by country regressions that TOT, Growth, inflation, and export growth, columns 
5, 6, 7, 8 and 13, 14, 15, 16 also include two lags of the dependent variables. In columns 1, 5, 9, 13 TOT shocks are 
also entered squared, in columns 2, 6, 10, 14 growth is entered squared, in columns 3, 7, 11, 15 inflation is entered 
squared, in columns 4,  8, 16 and 16 export growth is also entered squared.   34
Table 11: Cross Country Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
  VOL_P VOL_P VOL_P  VOL_P  VOL_P VOL_P VOL_P VOL_P VOL_P VOL_P  VOL_P  VOL_P VOL_P 
LGDPPC  -0.011 -0.013 -0.006  -0.005  -0.010 -0.009 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.011  -0.000  -0.010   
  (3.10)***  (3.00)***  (2.10)** (0.58) (3.27)***  (3.19)***  (2.59)** (2.39)** (2.36)**  (3.10)*** (0.04) (2.84)***   
VOL_TOT  0.033             0.033      
  (0.60)             (0.60)      
OPEN  -0.015 -0.016 -0.018  -0.012  -0.018 -0.017 -0.010 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015  -0.008  -0.009 -0.008 
  (2.47)** (2.45)**  (2.75)***  (2.00)* (2.66)**  (2.77)***  (1.46)  (2.47)** (2.56)** (2.47)**  (1.20)  (1.63)  (1.19) 
VOL_GROWTH    -0.027                 
    ( 0 . 1 1 )                  
VOL_EXP     0.283               
     ( 1 . 4 2 )                
RULE_WB      -0.014         -0.017    -0.017 
      (1.59)         (2.13)**    (3.83)*** 
CONC4        0.073            
        ( 1 . 5 7 )             
CONC10          0.090       0.101  0.098  0.102 
          (1.80)*       (2.13)**  (2.04)**  (2.12)** 
LGDP           0.003      0.004  0.005  0.004 
           (1.11)      (1.37)  (1.55)  (1.37) 
FIN_DEPTH            0.001         
            ( 0 . 0 5 )          
DC_GDP             -0.006    -0.007  -0.016  -0.007 
             (0.47)    (0.53)  (1.20)  (0.53) 
Constant  0.147 0.164 0.075  0.102  0.126 0.122 0.152 0.162 0.157 0.147  0.009  0.085 0.007 
  (4.02)*** (3.74)***  (1.73)*  (1.54)  (4.52)*** (4.41)*** (4.82)*** (3.62)*** (3.77)*** (4.02)***  (0.16)  (1.97)*  (0.19) 
Observations  60 60 60  53  53 53 60 60 60 60  53  53 53 
R-squared  0.34 0.33 0.45  0.37  0.45 0.47 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34  0.53  0.50 0.53 
Robust  t  statistics  in  parentheses         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 12: Share of difference explained by regressions  
Share explained by   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
LGDPPC  79.7% 94.2% 43.5% 36.2% 72.5% 65.2% 116.0% 94.2% 87.0%    72.5%   
VOL_TOT  6.5%               
OPEN  -6.9% -7.3% -8.3% -5.5% -8.3% -7.8% -4.6% -7.3% -7.3% -3.7%  -4.1%  -3.7% 
VOL_GROWTH    -2.0%              
VOL_EXP     35.4%                  
RULE_WB      72.0%        87.5%  0.0%  87.5% 
CONC4       13.7%           
CONC10        16.1%      18.0%  17.5%  18.2% 
LGDP         -22.9%     -30.5%  -38.2%  -30.5% 
FIN_DEPTH          -1.3%        
DC_GDP           10.3%  12.0%  27.5%  12.0% 
TOT EXPLAINED BY 
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Table 13: ARCH Estimations 
  1    2    3    4    5    6   
Mean Equation 
RER(-1)  0.8078    0.8533    0.8759    0.9630    0.9737    0.9844   
  55.5258 ***  32.8036 ***  34.9352 ***  33.7198 ***  28.0731 ***  28.5951 *** 
RER(-2)  -0.2025   -0.2803   -0.2940   -0.2904   -0.2743   -0.2815  
  12.1422 ***  14.8160 ***  17.0880 ***  11.3483 ***  9.7926 ***  9.3137 *** 
TOT  0.0945   0.0817   0.0886   0.0920   0.0758   0.0757  
  5.9043 ***  5.0893 ***  5.9312 ***  4.7080 ***  2.6945 ***  2.6403 *** 
G  0.1662   0.1341   0.1151   0.1098   0.1202   0.1269  
  4.0782 ***  4.6520 ***  4.1516 ***  3.4109 ***  3.0098 ***  3.1642 *** 
IND  -0.0017   0.0074   0.0081   0.0000   -0.0004   -0.0003  
  0.3350     2.3364 **  2.5894 **  0.0114     0.1103     0.1015    
RER(-1)*IND                -0.0235    -0.0073   
                      0.3620     0.1142    
RER(-2)*IND                -0.0580    -0.0732   
                      0.7918     1.0797    
TOT*IND                0.0214    -0.1180   
                      0.5251     2.6969  *** 
G*IND                -0.0336    0.0107   
                      0.4935     0.1505    
C0  -0.0002   -0.0090   -0.0093   -0.0008   -0.0004   0.0015  
  0.0335     3.2004 ***  3.6999 ***  0.2989     0.1342     0.5349    
Variance Equation 
CC  0.0132    0.0041    0.0032    0.0013    0.0013    0.0012   
  42.7116 ***  16.6781 ***  11.9595 ***  5.3670 ***  5.3222 ***  5.4703 *** 
IND  -0.0118   -0.0033   -0.0022   -0.0006   -0.0005   -0.0003  
  35.7181 ***  13.4456 ***  7.3904 ***  2.1942 **  2.0687 **  1.5380    
RER(-1)            0.1155    0.1182    0.1433   
                 4.8322  ***  4.8926  ***  5.5479  *** 
RER(-2)            0.0990    0.0974    0.1264   
                 11.1969  ***  11.1622  ***  12.4810  *** 
TOT            0.0251    0.0281    0.0453   
                 1.5531     1.6181     2.3819  ** 
G            0.0624    0.0636    0.0375   
                 1.5613     1.5529     0.8320    
RER(-1)*IND                   -0.0153   
                           0.2921    
RER(-2)*IND                   -0.1340   
                           4.1150  *** 
TOT*IND                   -0.0733   
                           3.5613  *** 
G*IND                   0.0355   
ARCH1      0.4051    0.5492    0.3464    0.3443    0.2650   
        7.7760 ***  7.0169 ***  6.8953 ***  6.8776 ***  7.0531 *** 
ARCH2      0.3622   0.5329   0.3399   0.3461   0.2715  
        9.1353 ***  8.7162 ***  5.2305 ***  5.1714 ***  4.7033 *** 
ARCH1  *IND          -0.3484   -0.3074   -0.3029   -0.1161  
              3.0319 ***  3.6385 ***  3.4681 ***  1.4825    
ARCH2*IND          -0.4917   -0.3512   -0.3664   -0.2776  
              5.8929 ***  4.1644 ***  4.3373 ***  4.2525 ***   37
Table 14: ARCH Estimations. The effect of GDP per capita 
  1  2  3  4  
Mean Equation 
RER1  0.9688  0.9441  0.9634  0.9963  
  31.08 *** 31.31 *** 26.46 *** 28.32 *** 
RER-SQUARED  -0.2986  -0.2762  -0.2753  -0.2803  
  10.57 *** 10.88 *** 10.43 ***  9.97  *** 
TOT  0.1145  0.1172  0.1354  0.1286  
  5.57 *** 5.94 *** 4.54 *** 4.21 *** 
G  0.1478  0.1328  0.1035  0.1238  
  4.06 *** 3.77 *** 2.43  **  2.98 *** 
IND  -0.0007  -0.0006  -0.0006  -0.0014  
  0.17  0.14  0.14  0.34  
GDPPC  0.0063  0.0068  0.0070  0.0046  
  2.04 ** 2.20 ** 2.30 ** 1.46   
RER1*GDPPC         -0.0104  -0.0181  
         0.68  1.29  
RER-SQUARED*GDPPC         -0.0080  -0.0063  
         0.48  0.39  
TOT*GDPPC         -0.0146  -0.0187  
         1.44  1.86  * 
G*GDPPC         0.0181  0.0216  
  0.00  0.00  1.08  1.30  
CONST  -0.0247  -0.0276  -0.0282  -0.0174  
  2.11 ** 2.34 ** 2.44 ** 1.46   
Variance Equation 
CONST  0.0030  0.0023  0.0023  0.0010  
  4.49 *** 3.18 *** 3.10 *** 1.25   
IND  -0.0012  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0003  
  3.24  ***  1.23  1.14  0.78  
GDPPC  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  0.0000  
  1.99  *  1.54  1.50  0.04  
RER1  0.1275  0.1029  0.1051  -0.3827  
  5.81 *** 3.95 *** 3.89 *** 2.35  ** 
RER-SQUARED  0.0792  0.0849  0.0831  0.5498  
  6.47 *** 6.24 *** 6.29 *** 9.77 *** 
TOT  0.0257  0.0225  0.0102  0.4964  
  1.31  1.01  0.45  4.24  *** 
G  -0.0045  0.0038  0.0101  -0.1906  
  0.11  0.09  0.24  0.75  
RER*GDPPC         0.1293   
         3.15  *** 
RER-SQUARED*GDPPC         -0.1295   
         8.48  *** 
TOT*GDPPC         -0.1238   
         4.33  *** 
G*GDPPC         0.0493   
         0.75   
ARCH1  0.2725  0.3518  0.3587  0.3305  
  6.25 *** 5.30 *** 5.26 *** 4.95 *** 
ARCH2  0.2176  0.4076  0.4273  0.4125  
  3.87 *** 4.76 *** 4.94 *** 5.32 *** 
ARCH1*IND     -0.3187  -0.3174  -0.2775  
      3.36 *** 3.25 *** 2.86 *** 
ARCH2*IND     -0.3514  -0.3803  -0.2497  
      2.59 ** 2.83  ***  1.72  *   38
 
 
Table 15: ARCH Estimations. The effect of Rule of Law 
  1    2    3    4   
Mean Equation 
RER1  0.9668    0.9447    0.9932    1.0484   
  31.80 *** 32.39 *** 28.31 ***  5473.87  *** 
RER-SQUARED  -0.2890  -0.2672  -0.2458  -0.3109  
  9.79  *** 10.48 ***  9.60  ***  2547.06  *** 
TOT  0.1153  0.1125  0.0772  0.0953  
  5.85 *** 5.92 *** 2.81 ***  470.51  *** 
G  0.1650  0.1449  0.1161  0.1364  
  4.65 *** 4.23 *** 2.86 ***     
IND  -0.0011  -0.0012  -0.0015  -0.0020  
  0.16  0.21  0.26      
ROL  0.0021  0.0026  0.0022  -0.0001  
  0.64  0.86  0.72      
RER1*ROL       -0.0690    -0.1411   
       1.91  *   
RER-SQUARED*ROL       -0.0460    0.0048   
       1.22     
TOT*ROL       0.0068    -0.0343   
       0.34     
G*ROL       0.0523    0.0438   
       1.33     
CONST  -0.0011  -0.0022  -0.0010   0.0011   
  0.35  0.71  0.31      
Variance Equation 
CONST  0.0021    0.0015    0.0014    0.0011   
  6.08 *** 4.22 *** 4.12 *** 8.06 *** 
IND  -0.0006  -0.0001  0.0000   0.0002   
  1.22  0.13  0.07  1.38  
ROL  -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0004  -0.0007  
  2.31  **  1.76 * 1.75 *     
RER1  0.1171  0.0954  0.1017  0.1414  
  5.67 *** 3.78 *** 3.82 *** 8.55 *** 
RER-SQUARED  0.0932  0.1017  0.0910  0.1129  
  9.32 *** 9.57 *** 7.77 *** 27.87 *** 
TOT  0.0271  0.0196  0.0140  0.0542  
  1.44  0.91  0.63  4.93  *** 
G  -0.0183  -0.0046  -0.0020  -0.0077  
  0.48  0.11  0.05  0.76  
RER*ROL         -0.0238   
         2.81  *** 
RER-SQUARED*ROL         -0.0750   
         34.60  *** 
TOT*ROL         -0.0549   
         9.17  *** 
G*ROL         0.0171   
         3.31  *** 
ARCH1  0.2441    0.3182    0.3147    0.2671   
  6.37 *** 5.44 *** 5.32 *** 4.97 *** 
ARCH2  0.1834  0.4078  0.4885  0.2879  
  3.63 *** 4.72 *** 5.18 *** 4.81 *** 
ARCH1*IND     -0.2869  -0.2806  -0.0987  
      3.35 *** 3.26 *** 1.83  * 
ARCH2*IND     -0.4030  -0.4942  -0.3093  
      3.60 *** 4.37 *** 5.17 *** 
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Table 16: ARCH Estimations. The effect of Financial Development 
  1    2    3    4   
Mean Equation 
RER1  0.9674    0.9428    0.9761    1.0096   
  31.25 *** 31.77 *** 26.94 *** 28.73 *** 
RER-SQUARED  -0.2966  -0.2708  -0.2667  -0.2961  
  10.45 *** 10.87 *** 10.27 *** 10.14 *** 
TOT  0.1117  0.1131  0.1150  0.1022  
  5.48 *** 5.77 *** 3.86 *** 3.29 *** 
G  0.1548  0.1402  0.1102  0.1238  
  4.36 *** 4.09 *** 2.64 *** 2.96 *** 
IND  -0.0021  -0.0029  -0.0029  -0.0011  
  0.30  0.45  0.45  0.17  
FD2  0.0026  0.0032  0.0029  0.0007  
  0.97  1.29  1.20  0.28  
RER1*FD2         -0.0072  -0.0144  
         1.09  2.28  ** 
RER-SQUARED*FD2         -0.0041  -0.0004  
         0.57  0.06  
TOT*FD2         -0.0043  -0.0029  
         1.00  0.75  
G*RFD2         0.0089  0.0093  
  0.00  0.00  1.21  1.32  
CONST  -0.0219  -0.0274  -0.0248  -0.0054  
  1.04  1.41  1.28  0.27  
Variance Equation 
CONST  0.0037    0.0031    0.0031    0.0011   
  2.68  ***  2.20 ** 2.24 ** 0.73   
IND  -0.0010  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0004  
  2.06  **  0.51  0.36  0.91  
FD2  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  0.0000  
  1.34  1.29  1.36  0.07  
RER1  0.1103  0.0858  0.0907  0.0812  
  5.12 *** 3.27 *** 3.31 *** 0.60   
RER-SQUARED  0.0858  0.0934  0.0908  0.4692  
  6.90 *** 7.10 *** 7.33 *** 8.22 *** 
TOT  0.0274  0.0207  0.0108  0.3812  
  1.35  0.92  0.47  3.75  *** 
G  -0.0163  -0.0043  -0.0003  -0.0314  
  0.45  0.11  0.01  0.12  
RER*FD2         0.0037   
         0.23   
RER-SQUARED*Fd2         -0.0481   
         6.68  *** 
TOT*FD2         -0.0420   
         4.12  *** 
G*FD2         0.0039   
         0.13   
ARCH1  0.2597    0.3379    0.3363    0.2338   
  6.23 *** 5.27 *** 5.21 *** 5.15 *** 
ARCH2  0.2326  0.4453  0.4722  0.3710  
  4.10 *** 5.11 *** 5.32 *** 5.06 *** 
ARCH1*IND     -0.3048  -0.2925  -0.1341  
      3.40 *** 3.18 *** 1.77  * 
ARCH2*IND     -0.3857  -0.4236  -0.2977  
      2.86 *** 3.14 *** 2.56  ** 
   40
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